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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HOLDING THAT 
THE STEEL PIPE LOCATED IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF 
LOT 25, LITTLE MOUNTAIN SUBDIVISION NO. 2, 
EMIGRATION CANYON, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, IS THE 
PROPER CONTROL POINT FROM WHICH TO ESTABLISH THE 
COMMON BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN STRUHS' LOT 38 AND 
HATANAKA'S LOT 39 OF THE LITTLE MOUNTAIN SUB-
DIVISION NO. 2, RATHER THAN PROPERLY LOCATING THE 
CONTROL POINT AS THE COMMENCEMENT POINT OF THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 27 OF THE SAME 
SUBDIVISION. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained at 61 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," in 
the addendum to this brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision of 
the Court of Appeals under a petition for a writ of certiorari is 
conferred under Rule 42, R. Utah S. Ct. The date of the entry of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is July 6, 1987. 
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STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, REGULATIONS, ETC, 
17-23-9 
It shall 
order of 
Re-establishment of lines and corners 
be the duty of each county surveyor on 
the county commissioners to at once 
re-establish missing or obliterated government 
lines and corners in his county and perpetuate 
the same by suitable monuments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-23-9 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
5 7 - 3 - 2 . Record imparts notice. Every 
con v ey a n c e, o r ins t r urn e n't" i n w riting affecting 
real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this 
title, and e\fery patent to lands within this 
state duly executed and verified according to 
law, and every judgment, order or decree of any 
court of record in this state, or a copy thereof, 
required by law to be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder, and every financing 
statement which complies with the provisions of 
section 70A-9-492 shall, from the time of filing 
the same with the records for record, impart 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof; 
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien 
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with 
noti ce. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
The boundaries and contents of the several 
sections, half-sections, and quarter-sections of 
the public lands shall be ascertained in con-
formity with the following principles: 
First. All the corners marked in the 
surveys, returned by the Secretary of the 
Interior or such agency as he may d e s i g n a t e , 
shall be established as the proper corners of 
sections, or subdivisions of sections, which they 
were intended to designate; and the corners of 
half-sections and quarter-sections, not marked on 
the surveys, shall be placed as nearly as 
possible equidistant from two corners which stand 
on the same line. 
ai 
S( 
m< 
b( 
considered as the true length thereof. And the 
boundary lines which have not been actually run 
and marked shall be ascertained, by running 
straight lines from the established corners to 
the opposite corresponding corners; but in those 
portions of the fractional townships where no 
such opposite corresponding corners have been or 
can be fixed, the boundary lines shall be 
ascertained by running from the established 
corners due north and south or east and west 
lines, as the case may be, to the watercourse, 
Indian boundary line, or other external boundary 
of such fractional township. 
Third. Each section or subdivision of 
section, the contents whereof have been returned 
by the Secretary of the Interior or such agency 
as he may designate, shall be held and considered 
as containing the exact quantity expressed in 
such return; and the half sections and quarter 
sections, the contents whereof shall not have 
been thus returned, shall be held and considered 
as containing the one-half or the one-fourth 
part, respectively, of the returned contents of 
the section of which they may make part. 
43 U.S.C. § 752 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners, K.E. Struhs and Jacqueline Struhs ("Struhs11 
h e r e a f t e r ) , appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals (see 
Exhibit "A" in addendum) affirming the Judgment (R. 190-193) (see 
Exhibit "B" in addendum) granting Respondent, Tad Hatanaka's 
("Hatanaka" h e r e a f t e r ) , claim for trespass against Struhs arising 
from a boundary dispute between Struhs and Hatanaka (R. 2-5) 
Trial in this matter was held before the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft on July 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1984. The trial court 
rendered its Memorandum Decision on August 21, 1984 (See Exhibit 
"C" in addendum) and the Judgment (R. 190-193) was entered on 
November 7, 1984, determining the location of the common property 
line between the adjacent property of Struhs and Hatanaka and in so 
-4-
doing ruled that Struhs committed a trespass on Hatanaka's pro-
perty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment of the trial 
court on the issue of trespass. Hatanaka v. Struhs, 61 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1987) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Struhs and Hatanaka are owners of adjoining parcels of 
real property in Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, Emigration 
Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah ("Little Mountain" hereafter) (R. 
1 1 6 ) . Struhs owns all of lots 37 and 38 in Little Mountain and lot 
1 in Killyons Subdivision, Block II ("Killyons" hereafter). Lot 1, 
in Killyons lies to the immediate north of lot 37 in Little 
Mountain and Killyons lies to the immediate north of Little 
Mountain (R. 1 1 6 ) . Hatanaka owns lots 39 and 40 and the upper 
one-half of lot 41 in Little Mountain. Lots 38 and 39 share the 
common boundary line between the properties. Hatanaka fs northern-
most lot 39 lies to the south of and shares a common boundary line 
with Struhs' southernmost lot 38. Hatanaka v. Struhs, supra. 
Both subdivisions are situated in Section 27, TIN, R2E, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian (R. 1 1 6 ) . The commencement point for 
Little Mountain is the southwest corner of section 27, while the 
commencement point for Killyons is the northwest corner of 
section 27 (R. 116, 1 1 7 ) . A steel pipe of unknown origin is 
located at the northwest corner of lot 25 in Little Mountain. 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, supra. 
In 1979 Struhs constructed a chain link fence which ran 
north and south along the easterly property line of the lots and 
then turns westerly for a distance of about 45 feet. Hatanaka 
claims the fence intrudes approximately 79 feet onto his frontage 
and 45 feet into his lot 39 (R. 117). Hatanaka also claims that 
Struhs placed a substantial amount of fill dirt on the northerly 
side of the fence extending westerly into lot 39 (R. 117). 
Hatanaka commenced suit against Struhs claiming that 
Struhs trespassed upon and wrongfully constructed and maintained 
the fence and placed the fill dirt on property owned by Hatanaka 
(R. 2-5). Hatanaka sought injunctive relief against maintenance of 
the fence, an order requiring its removal, and restoration of the 
property to its original condition. (R. 117). Struhs denies any 
trespass (R. 18-20; 118). 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
A writ of certiorari should be granted because the 
decision of the Court of Appeals decides a question of state and 
federal law that is in conflict with prior decisions of this Court. 
The decision affirms that Struhs committed a trespass against 
Hatanaka. The basis for determining that a trespass occurred is 
from evidence recognizing that the control point for Little 
Mountain is a steel pipe. The location of the steel pipe from the 
evidence given at trial has not been properly located and as a 
reference point for the subdivision is contrary to both federal and 
Utah law. 
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties dispute the 
fact that the starting point of Little Mountain is the southwest 
corner of section 27. As described in the BLM field notes of 1881, 
the place for commencement of the southwest corner of section 27 is 
a sandstone monument. That monument has never been located (R. 
119). At a later uncertain time, the Salt Lake County Surveyor 
inserted a 6 x 6 cedar post in the ground and designated it as the 
southwest corner of section 27. The post has been recognized and 
continues to be recognized by the Salt Lake County Surveyor's 
office as the commencement point of the southwest corner of section 
27 (R. 5 8 8 ) . Neither party disputes that the 6 x 6 cedar post is 
incorrectly located (R. 1 1 9 ) . 
Using the 6 x 6 cedar post as the commencement point of 
Little Mountain results in a shift of the entire subdivision to the 
east by about 100 feet. (R. 1 1 9 ) . The true location of the 
southwest corner of section 27 has not been established and the 
correct control point for Little Mountain, that is, the southwest 
corner of section 27, is either lost or obliterated. 
The Court of Appeals 1 decision uses the steel pipe as the 
control point from which to determine the common boundary between 
the parties and the commencement point of the southwest corner of 
section 27. The Court of Appeals does this by referencing surveys 
which were testified about at the trial. 
A steel pipe of unknown origin is located at the 
northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little Mountain. 
Several surveys during the past forty years have 
been conducted using the steel pipe as a control 
point. Surveys from the steel pipe to the 
southwest corner of section 27 establish the 
beginning point of Little Mountain such that the 
BLM and UDOT survey notes indicate conformity 
with the terrain as it physically exists. 
Hatakana v. Struhs, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1 9 8 7 ) . The 
measurements used in the surveys never tie in nor relate the steel 
pipe to the commencement point of the subdivision and, most 
importantly, the other section corners of the subdivision. 
The use of the steel pipe by way of the subsequent 
surveys are in conflict with this Court's previous rulings and 
seeks to vary the original survey work done on the property. Until 
the southwest corner of section 27 is correctly determined and 
recognized by the Salt Lake County Surveyor's office, there cannot 
be a determination as to whether Struhs committed a trespass 
against Hatanaka because the correct boundary line between the 
parties is not known. 
Under Utah law it is the statutory duty of the county 
surveyor to re-establish missing or obliterated government lines 
and corners. 
17-23-9 Re-establishment of lines and corners.-
It shall be the duty of each county surveyor on 
order of the county commissioners to at once 
re-establish missing or obliterated government 
lines and corners in his county and perpetuate 
the same by suitable monuments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-23-9 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
This duty lies solely with the county surveyor. Official 
government surveys connot be changed in a dispute over boundary 
lines between individuals. Barbizon of Utah, Inc., v. General Oil 
Co., 24 Utah 2d 321, individuals. 471 P.2d 148, 150 (1970) (quoting 
with approval, Vaught v. McClymond, 116 Mont. 542, 155 P.2d 612, 
619 (1945)) See also, Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P.2d 154, 
157 ( 1 9 3 7 ) . 
The 6 x 6 cedar post is incorrectly located as the 
commencing point of the southwest corner of section 27, and yet 
continues to be recognized by the Salt Lake County Surveyor's 
office as the commencement point of Little Mountain. (R. 5 8 8 ) . 
The location of the corner is either lost or obliterated. The Court 
of Appeals and the trial court never acknowledge that the southwest 
corner is either "lost" or "obliterated." 1 
In the instant action, the Court of Appeals gives 
discretion to the findings of fact of the trial court which 
findings never determine whether the southwest corner of section 27 
is lost or obliterated. (See Exhibit "D" in addendum) Instead, 
the Court of Appeals and the trial court renders their decisions 
based on subsequent surveys which never locate the original corner 
of the subdivision and which use as a control point for Little 
Mountain the steel pipe located in the northwest corner of lot 25. 
Utah law requires that in locating the southwest corner 
of section 27 the section corner established in the original survey 
be the first point of reference. In Barbizon of Utah, Inc., 471 
P.2d at 150, the Court cites with approval the Vaught, supra, 
opinion stating: 
But the government surveys are, as a matter of 
law, the best evidence; and, if the boundaries 
of land are clearly established thereby, other 
evidence is superfluous and may be excluded; the 
best evidence is the corners actually fixed upon 
the ground by the government surveyor, in default 
of which the field notes and plats come next, 
unless satisfactory evidence is produced that the 
corner was actually located upon the ground at a 
point different from that stated in the field 
notes. 
In Cornia v. Putnam, 26 Utah 2d 354, 489 P.2d 1001, 1005 
(1971 ) , the fai1ure of the trial court to determine whether a 
corner was lost or obliterated caused this Court to reverse the 
trial court's decision and remand the case for a new trial. 
See also, Appeal by Martin Childers v. Hoffer, 177 Kan. 174, 277 
P.2d 625 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . The southwest corner of section 27 has never been 
properly located as a point of reference because no one has 
compelled the Salt Lake County Surveyor's office to find the 
correct location of the corner. 
Federal law requires that a section corner which is 
either lost or obliterated be retraced using the established 
corners in the subdivision. The other section corners must be 
considered in establishing the commencing point of the southwest 
corner of section 27 and the proper control point for establishing 
the location of Little Mountain. 
The boundaries and contents of the several 
s e c t i o n s , h a l f - s e c t i o n s , and q u a r t e r - s e c t i o n s of 
the public lands shall be ascertained in 
conformity with the following p r i n c i p l e s : 
First. All the corners marked in the 
s u r v e y s , returned by the Secretary of the 
Interior or such agency as he may d e s i g n a t e , 
shall be established as the proper corners of 
s e c t i o n s , or subdivisions of s e c t i o n s , which they 
were intended to d e s i g n a t e ; and the corners of 
half-sections and q u a r t e r - s e c t i o n s , nor marked on 
the s u r v e y s , shall be placed as nearly as 
possible equidistant from two corners which stand 
on the same 1i ne. 
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lines, as the case may be, to the watercourse, 
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of such fractional township. 
Third. Each section or subdivision of 
section, the contents whereof have been returned 
by the Secretary of the Interior or such agency 
as he may designate, shall be held and considered 
as containing the exact quantity expressed in 
such return; and the half sections and quarter 
sections, the contents whereof shall not have 
been thus returned, shall be held and considered 
as containing the one-half or the one-fourth 
part, respectively, of the returned contents of 
the section of which they may make part. 
43 U.S.C. § 752 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . 
The use of the steel pipe as a reference point for the subdivision 
fails to take into consideration the other existing section corners 
in the subdivision, and the section corners of either Little 
Mountain or Killyons subdivisions. 
The leading Utah case discussing the use of subsequent 
surveys is Washington Rock Co., v. Young, 29 Utah 108, 80 P. 382 
( 1 9 0 5 ) . This action concerned a controversy over a lost boundary 
or survey. The parties owned adjacent land and were in dispute 
over the location of the boundary line between their two pro-
perties. Each party presented testimony concerning conflicting 
surveys to determine the correct location of the property line. 
The issue presented to the court was which survey correctly 
determined the original corner from which the property boundary 
could be determined. This court set forth the following general 
rul e: 
The law is well settled that an original survey 
of lands, upon the faith of which property rights 
have been based and acquired, controls over 
surveys subsequently made which injuriously 
affect such rights. 
Washington Rock, 80 P. at 385. The Court ruled that the original 
survey should be retraced through the original field notes of the 
surveyor. The Court states at 386: 
Where the monuments of corners, which, if 
standing would fix the boundaries of a tract of 
land, are lost, as in this instance, but the 
corner monument, from which the initial survey 
was made, remains intact, such monument, in the 
absence of other controlling evidence of the 
original survey which will protect the property 
rights acquired on the faith of that survey, and 
which will be more likely to restore the original 
lines and monuments, should be resorted to and 
adopted as the beginning point of subsequent 
surveys of the same tract of land. 
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals, along with 
the Judgment (R. 190-193) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 168-189) (see Exhibit "D" in a d d e n d u m ) , the control point 
for Little Mountain is the steel pipe while the county surveyor's 
office continues to recognize the 6 x 6 cedar post as the 
commencing point of the southwest corner of section 2 7 . The corner 
continues to be either lost or obliterated. 
Under the Court of Appeals 1 decision, the control point 
which is now used to measure the property boundaries in Little 
Mountain, including lots 38 and 39, is the steel pipe in the 
northwest corner of lot 25. This control point is in error for 
several reasons. The steel pipe has no reference points in the 
original Cassity Plat, nor in the original B.L.M. survey notes. The 
steel pipe originates from the Utah Department of Transportation 
survey plat map which is not an official survey because it has 
never been properly recorded. It affords none of the lot owners 
constructive notice of the location of the boundaries in the 
subdivision. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1977) There was no 
competent evidence presented to establish that the steel pipe was 
correctly located in the northwest corner of lot 25, how that 
commencement point was established under the state survey plat map, 
nor was there competent evidence presented to establish that the 
steel pipe ties into the commencing point of the southwest corner 
of section 2 7 . See Gilman Paper Co. v. Newman, 398 So.2d 887 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1 9 8 1 ) . 
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals several 
conclusions can be reached. First, the steel pipe becomes the 
controlling point of reference for the subdivision without the 
required statutory approval by the Salt Lake County Surveyor. 
Second, the new commencement point does not take into consideration 
the location of the other section corners, which is contrary to 
both federal statutes and Utah law. No one disputes that the 
subdivision contains a shortage in property. However, with the 
steel pipe as the controlling point of reference, the steel pipe 
does not equate with the other section corners in the subdivision 
and with the commencement points of Little Mountain and Killyons 
subdivisions. 
A third conclusion of using the steel pipe as the new 
reference point for the subdivision is that the Court of Appeals in 
affirming the trial court's Judgment has quieted title, in an 
action for trespass, to the ownership rights of all property owners 
in Little Mountain, with the northernmost property owner, Struhs, 
taking the shortage for the deficiency in the subdivision. All 
property owners in the subdivision now measure their property lines 
based on the location of the steel pipe and the location of the 
common boundary line of lot 38 and lot 39, regardless of the 
correctness of those measuring points to the other property owners 
The Court of Appeals has randomly selected the northernmost 
property owner to suffer the deficiency in the subdivision. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law the Court of Appeals erred in its 
decision. The use of the steel pipe as the control point for the 
Little Mountain subdivision, rather than properly locating the 
commencement point of the southwest corner of section 27 is 
contrary to both Utah and federal law. Petitioners respectfully 
request that a writ of certiorari be granted. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1987. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
^ 
V*«^ 
D. Veasy 
Attorneys for Petit rs 
ADDENDUM 
61 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 33 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Tad HATANAKA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
K. E. STRUHS and Jacqueline Straus, his 
wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Ormc, Garff and Davidson. 
No. 860087-CA 
FILED: July 6,1937 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Bryant H. Croft 
ATTORNEYS: 
Roy G. Hasiam, Paul D. Veasy, John Walsh 
for Appellants. 
John S. Chindlund, James A. Boevers for 
Respondents. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
The Third District Court ordered defendants 
to remove the fence, dirt, and debris they 
placed on what was determined to be plain-
tiffs property. Defendants were permanently 
enjoined from placing any additional fences, 
debris or fill on the land at issue. The trial 
court Judgment decreed that neither party was 
entitled to an allowance of attorney'^ fees 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981), 
plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages 
because defendants' trespass was not willful, 
and that plaintiff was entitled to recover his 
costs. Defendants appeal from the Judgment 
and the denial of their Motion for a New 
Trial, Motion to Alter or Amend the Judg-
ment, and Motion for Reconsideration. Plai-
ntiff cross-appeals from the denial of puni-
tive damages and attorney's fees. We affirm 
m part and reverse in part. 
The parties are owners of property in Little 
Mountain Subdivision No. 2 (Little Mountain) 
in Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiffs property includes Lot 39 and that 
of defendants includes Lot 38, with the two 
being adjacent. The Killyons Subdivision 
(Killyons) lies to the north of Little Mountain. 
Both subdivisions are situated in Section 27, 
TIN, R2E, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The 
southwest corner of Section 27 is the begin-
ning point of Little Mountain and that of 
Killyons is the northwest corner of the same 
section. Both subdivisions were platted by E. 
G. Swenson, then Salt Lake County Surveyor, 
in a private survey during 1909-1910. The U. 
S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) con-
ducted its survey of Section 27 in 1881. The 
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
also conducted a survey of Emigration Canyon 
between 1932 and 1936. The field notes from 
both of these surveys still exist.1 
The 1881 BLM s\urvey notes state that a 
sandstone monument was placed at the sout-
hwest corner of Section 27. This monument 
can no longer be found, although several 
surveys have attempted to do so. At some 
uncertain, previous date, the Salt Lake County 
Surveyor empiaced a 6 inch by 6 inch cedar 
post in the ground and designated it the sou-
thwest corner of Section 27. Subsequent 
surveys employing this post as the beginning 
point of Little Mountain indicated that either 
the subdivision has shifted over 100 feet to the 
east or the post is incorrectly placed. 
A steel pipe of unknown origin is located at 
the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little 
Mountain. Several surveys during the past 
forty years have been conducted using the steel 
pipe as a control point. Surveys from the steel 
pipe to the southwest corner of Section 27 
establish the beginning point of Little Moun-
tain such that the BLM and UDOT survey 
notes indicate conformity with the terrain as it 
physically exists. 
In 1962, defendants caused a survey to be 
conducted utilizing the steel pipe. This survey 
established a boundary, line between Lots 38 
and 39, but the results were not certified 
because the surveyor .could not tie it in with 
Killyons. In 1979, defendants installed a chain 
link fence well inside plaintiffs property 
based on the common boundary as established 
by defendants' 1962 survey. Plaintiff brought 
this action in April 1982. 
Plaintiff commissioned three surveys which 
were conducted in 1979, 1983, and 1984. 
These surveys employed the steel pipe in the 
northwest corner of Lot 25 as a control point. 
Information obtained from all surveys indic-
ated that the common boundary would be in 
the same position as determined by defend-
ants' initial survey. Defendants' second 
survey was executed in 1983. It utilized the 
beginning point of Killyons as a control point 
and was based on the assumption that Killyons 
and Little Mountain are contiguous. This 
survey was not certified but still placed defe-
ndants' fence approximately twenty feet inside 
plaintiffs land. In 1984, defendants placed fill 
dirt and debris on what they believed to be 
their side of the property line but which was in 
the disputed area. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) states that "[flindings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses/ In the instant 
case, the Findings of Fact were based on four 
days of trial and the testimony of thirteen 
witnesses.2 The critical Conclusion of Law 
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delineating the common boundary between the 
parties is based on the weight and credibility 
of the surveys found to be closest to what 
should be expected when the field notes of the 
BLM and UDOT surveys are consulted. 
Instead of being clearly erroneous, we believe 
that the Findings of Fact flow logically from 
the testimony presented and, therefore, will 
not be disturbed. As a result, defendants were 
trespassing on plaintiffs property when they 
constructed the fence and deposited the dirt 
and debris. That portion of the Judgment 
which ordered the removal of the fence, dirt, 
and debris, in addition to permanently enjoi-
ning defendants from doing similar future acts 
on plaintiffs property, is affirmed. That 
portion of the Judgment which delineates the 
common boundary between the parties is aff-
irmed. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in 
not awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981) which states: 
In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement, 
the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983) dis-
cusses the above Code section and its two 
elements. In the instant case it is not necessary 
to examine whether or not defendants' 
defense was asserted in "good faith* because it 
cannot be said that it was "without merit/ 
The trial record indicates, at great length, that 
court's reasoning why defendants' conduct 
evidenced some merit. We will not second 
guess the trial court's opinion and we affirm 
that portion of the Judgment. 
Plaintiff asserts additional error in that he 
contends the trial court should have awarded 
punitive damages. In Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Td., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 
1985), our Supreme Court set forth its pron-
ouncements in various past cases relating to 
punitive damages. Appropriate to the instant 
appeal is "[b]efore punitive damages may be 
awarded, the plaintiff must prove conduct that 
is willful and malicious, or that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference and disre-
gard toward the rights of others." (Citations 
omitted.) As in the issue of attorney's fees, 
the trial record reveals the court's belief that 
defendants' trespass was not willful and 
malicious. We believe that defendants' 
conduct does not approach the "knowing and 
reckless indifference and disregard" standard 
and thus, affirm that portion of the Judg-
ment. 
The final issue concerns defendants' asser-
tion that the trial court erred in awarding 
plaintiff costs of a survey conducted subseq-
uent to the commencement of this action. The 
Third District Court's Order of May 7, 1985, 
allowed surveyor's fees in the amount of 
$2,163.18. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs 
and Disbursements of November 14, 1984, 
indicates that he incurred the above cost on 
"1/16/84" for a survey conducted by 
"Larsen & Malmquist." At pages 303 and 304 
of the trial transcript, M. Carl Larsen, a 
partner of Larsen & Malmquist Consulting 
Engineers and Land Surveyors, testified that 
he conducted the survey per the instructions of 
plaintiffs counsel. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (d)(1) states: 
Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute 
of this state or in these Rules, costs 
shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs.... 
The case of Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 
771, 773-774 (Utah 1980), indicates that costs 
are "generally allowable only in the amounts 
and in the manner provided by statute" but 
the Supreme Court "has taken the position 
that the trial court can exercise reasonable 
discretion in regard to the allowance of costs; 
and that it has a duty to guard against any 
excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." 
(footnote omitted.) That Court continued: 
"There is a distinction to be understood 
between the legitimate and taxable 'costs' and 
other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be 
ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable 
as costs." Id. at 774. 
The Utah Supreme Court examined this 
precise issue in Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 
251, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961). There, defendants 
built on property which was later determined 
to be owned by plaintiffs. In order to deter-
mine the true boundary line of this Emigration 
Canyon property, plaintiffs commissioned two 
surveys and defendants had a third survey 
conducted. The trial court awarded plaintiffs 
one-half of the reasonable costs of the survey 
upon which they relied. The Supreme Court 
modified the Judgment on this issue declaring 
"[s]uch expenditures are not in the nature of 
costs nor damages. The surveys were made in 
preparation of plaintiffs' case." 
The similarities between Stratford and the 
instant case are inescapable. Hatanaka relied 
on the Larsen & Malmquist survey which was 
conducted after the action was filed and was 
necessary to assist in the preparation of his 
case. It cannot be considered to be a "cost. 
We hold the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding plaintiff the costs relating to the 
survey in view of the clear direction of this 
state's highest Court. That portion of the 
award of costs is ordered stricken. 
Each party will bear its own costs on 
appeal. 
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Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
1. Field notes are the record of the party conducting 
the survey and can be referred to by subsequent 
surveys which reestablish points previously determ-
ined by the original survey. 
2. The court drafted an exhaustive, well written 
Memorandum Decision containing specific Findings 
of Fact. This has proven to be of great benefit in 
revealing the court's view of the evidence and the 
basis for its decision. 
Cite as 
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Appellants. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Dubois appeals a jury verdict against him, 
awarding $40,000 in damages to the Aults for 
his voluntary waste of their property. We 
affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In May of 1972, Dubois contacted Mr. Ault 
and together they agreed that Ault would rent 
a house and 30 acres of land in Vernon, Utah 
to Dubois for use as a boys' ranch. There was 
no written agreement, and Dubois became a 
tenant on a month-to-month basis. Rent 
for the house and land was a modest $300 per 
month. There is some disagreement as to the 
condition of the house and land at commen-
cement of the tenancy. The Aults testified that 
the home was built in 1888, that it had been 
listed on the Utah Historic Register since 1974, 
and that it was currently being considered for 
listing on the National Register of Historic 
Places. Mr. Holland, employed by the State 
Division of Youth Corrections, testified that it 
was "a beautiful old home, very, very attrac-
tive/ On the other hand, Dubois stated that 
the condition prior to his possession was ext-
remely poor. According to him, the premises 
had apparently been left unsecured, and mul-
tiple loads of debris and garbage had to be 
removed from the area. The jury apparently 
credited the Aults* version over that offered 
by Dubois. 
The tenancy pursuant to the oral agreement 
continued for 10 years. In January of 1982, 
after disagreements developed with the Aults, 
Dubois relocated his boys' ranch to Fairfield, 
Utah. On or around January 7, Dubois 
vacated the home, leaving it unlocked. On 
January 11, Dubois notified the Aults of his 
leaving. On January 12, the Aults retook 
possession of the home and found it in sha-
mbles. The doors were left open, windows 
were broken, the heat had been turned off, 
and freezing conditions had resulted in broken 
pipes. 
The havoc included a damaged fireplace, 
broken doors, broken locks, damaged door 
frames, broken windows, missing doorknobs, 
broken light fixtures, large holes in the walls, 
and ripped wall paneling. In addition to the 
damage to the house itself, there were holes in 
the barn roof, bricks had been removed from 
the barn and the milk house, a granary which 
had once been the Vernon Post Office had 
been burned down, the irrigation system was 
damaged, and thirty eight trees had died 
because of insufficient watering or, at least in 
one case, as a result of being used by the res-
idents for ax or hatchet practice. Personal 
property belonging to the Aults, including 
roofing materials, chicken feeders, corrugated 
tin, a wheel barrow, two oak tables, a dining 
set, and a phonograph were also damaged. 
Dubois attributed the damage to acts of 
vandalism occuring after he vacated. The 
Aults filed insurance claims for damages 
caused by vandals, primarily for the broken 
windows, and received $4,800.l 
Aults then brought suit against Dubois to 
recover damages to the property and Dubois 
counterclaimed, seeking compensation for 
improvements made while he was in posses-
sion. By special verdict, the jury awarded the 
Aults $40,000 to compensate them for the 
damages caused by Dubois' voluntary waste. 
Dubois raises three main issues on appeal. 
First, he contends that the trial court erred in 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAD HATANAKA 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
Ks E. STRUHS and 
JACQUELINE STRUHS, his wife, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-82-3418 
(Judge Bryant Croft) 
The trial of the above-captioned case having been held 
on July 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1984, before the Honorable Bryant 
H. croft, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
CQujjty,, Utah; with John S, Chindlund of the firm of Prince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler appearing for plaintiff, and Roy G. Haslam 
190 
of the firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch appearing on behalf of 
defendants; and the Court, having reviewed and considered the 
pleadings on file herein, the exhibits presented at trial, the 
testimony of the witnesses and the parties, the final arguments 
of counsel, and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a mandatory perman-
ent injunction in favor of plaintiff and against defendants is 
granted. Defendants are hereby ordered to permanently: 
1. Remove, without further demand by plaintiff, and 
as soon as weather conditions permit, the southernmost 73 feet 
of their fence which runs along the west side of Emigration 
Canyon Road and the adjoining approximate 45 feet of fence 
which runs westward therefrom into plaintiff's Lot 39; 
2. As soon as weather conditions permit, and within 
a reasonable time after written demand from plaintiff, should 
plaintiff elect to make such demand, remove all dirt and debris 
that defendants have placed to the north of said approximate 45 
foot length of fence that extends westward into plaintiff's Lot 
39. 
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Defendants, their agents, servants and employees are 
further hereby permanently enjoined from building, or causing 
to be built, any fences upon plaintifffs Lot 39 or in the area 
between said lot and Emigration Canyon Road, placing any fill 
or debris upon or performing any other acts to or upon plain-
tiff's property which lies to the south of the boundary line 
between plainiff's Lot 39 and defendants' Lot 38. 
Said boundary line has a bearing of N. 79° 08' W and 
commences at a point which is 5 feet west from the west side of 
Emigration Canyon Road and 73 feet north of the present south-
east corner of defendants' fence and runs westerly on said 
bearing from said point for a distance of 116.54 feet. 
Niether party is entitled to an allowance of attor-
neys' fees under Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of punitive 
damages because defendants' trespass was not willful and 
malicious. 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs herein 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-3-
1S2 
DATED this / day of -fataotaVB, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
i ohn Vjfelsh 
Co-coMnsel for Defendants 
ATTEST 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD J&Lt^ IALc^ iMiiWjfc&t 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED HATANAKA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K.E. STRUHS and 
JACQUELINE STRUHS, his wife, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-3418 
\ 
\ 
The above-entitled case came on for trial before the Court 
on July 17, 18 & 19, 1984 with final arguments being heard on 
July 20, 1984. John S. Chindlund appeared as counsel for plaintiff, 
and Roy G. Haslam appeared as counsel for defendants. After 
argument of counsel, the Court took the case under advisement 
and now renders its decision thereon. 
Plaintiff is the owner of Lots 39, 40 and the northerly 
half of Lot 41 of Little Mountain Subdivision No.2 in Emigration 
Canyon. Defendants are the owners of Lots 37 and 38 of said 
subdivision with Lots 38 and 39 being contiguous to each other. 
Defendants also own Lot 1 in Killyons Subdivision, Block II, 
which subdivision lies to the north of Little Mountain Subdivision 
No. 2. Both subidivisons are situated in Section 27, TIN, R2E, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The beginning point for Little 
Mountain No. 2 is the southwest corner of Section 27, while 
^ . . a - « —*• " " 7 * 
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the beginning point for Killyon is the northwest corner of Section 
27. Both subdivisions were platted by E. G. Swenson with the 
former being recorded in 1910 and the latter in 1909 in the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. Copies of the original 
survey notes prepared by the U. S. Bureau of Land Management 
on its survey of Section 27 in 1881 were received into evidence. 
The case involves a boundary line dispute between the parties 
with respect to the location of the common boundary line between 
lots 38 and 39. Plaintiff acquired lot 39 in 1966 by purchase. 
Defendants acquired lot 38 by a quit claim deed dated June 27, 
1962. The action arises out of the fact that in 1979 defendants 
undertook to construct a chain link fence which ran north and 
south along the easterly line of the subdivision lots lying 
west of Emigration Canyon Road, which plaintiff contends fences 
off about 79 feet of the frontage of his lot 3 9, and then turns 
westerly for a distance of about 45 feet into what plaintiff 
claims is his lot 39. Plaintiff also contends that defendant 
Struhs placed a substantial amount of fill dirt on the northerly 
side of that part of the fence extending westerly into lot 39. 
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against maintenace of the 
fence upon his lot 39, seeks an order requiring its removal 
and the repair of any damage to lot 39 by reason of its construction, 
general and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. 
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Defendants by their Answer deny the chain link fence is 
built in front of or into lot 39 and alleges as an affirmative 
defense that the property on which the fence was built is all 
a part of lot 38 owned by them. 
The thrust of the evidence presented during the trial was 
towards the establishment of the location of the common boundary 
line between lots 38 and 39. At the conclusion of the trial 
defendants contended that plaintiff had failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the fence built by defendants 
did in fact intrude upon plaintiff's property and had thus failed 
to prove a trespass for which injunctive relief or damages could 
be awarded. In so contending defendants asserted that plaintiff 
failed to meet his burden of proof because markers used by the 
surveyor witnesses called by plaintiff were not valid, legal 
markers or monuments from which the location of the common boundary 
between lots 38 and 39 could be truly determined. The credibility 
of the evidence presented is a contested issue upon which the 
decision in the case must turn. 
An attack is made by defendants of the use by plaintiff's 
witnesses of a steel pipe said to be located at the southwest 
corner of Lot 26/ which is also the northwest corner of lot 
25/ of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 and presumed by such 
witnesses to be accurately located at such corner. Much of 
the evidence and testimony offered by plaintiff involved the 
lis 
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use of the iron pipe as a marker from which surveys of lots 
in Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 were made. 
As noted supra, the beginning point of that subdivision 
as platted in 1910 was the southwest corner of Section 27. 
A problem exists by reason of the fact that the sandstone monument 
which the BLM 1881 field notes identify as being the location 
of said southwest corner has never been located. Because of 
such fact sometime along the way the Salt Lake County Surveyor, 
who is recognized as having statutory authority for relocating 
or re-establishing section corner monuments, inserted a 6" x 
6W cedar post in the ground and declared it to be the southwest 
corner of Section 27. Regardless of such location by the county 
surveyorf all witnesses testifying at the trial were unanimous 
in their conclusions that that cedar post could not be the beginning 
point of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 because such location 
does not fit any subdivision survey and using it as a starting 
point for the subdivision results in a shift of the entire sub-
division to the east of about 107 feet and northward about six 
feet, leaving the homes of some of the owners of the west lots 
of the subdivision outside of, or upon the west boundary line 
of, the subdivision. Nothing fits in surveys made when the 
cedar post is used as the beginning point of the subdivision. 
I stated at the end of the trial and before argument that it 
was clear from the evidence that the cedar post could not be 
A 1 ^ 
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the beginning point for the subdivision and that the county 
surveyor could not by establishing it as the southwest corner 
of Section 27 thereby move the beginning point of the subdivision 
to that post, when, in fact, the beginning point of the subdivision 
as platted in 1910 was elsewhere. I so then ruled and no argument 
was heard on that issue. 
The original BLM field notes of the 1881 survey of Section 
27 recite that the surveyor had installed a sandstone monument 
at the southwest corner of Section 27. Each of the witnesses 
who testified concerning that corner stated that such sandstone 
marker had never been located. Robert Smeltzer, an employee 
of the Salt Lake County Surveyor's office since 1966, was called 
by defendants as a witness and was questioned as to what the 
county surveyor had done to locate the southwest corner of Section 
27. Smeltzer testified employees of that office had removed 
the cedar post, and dug down three feet to find the sandstone 
monument, but had found nothing. He stated they were now working 
to verify the southwest corner of Section 27; that they had 
found the west 1/4 corner of Section 34, which was 2658.66 feet 
from the cedar post; that no other corners had been located 
and that office was still looking; that a monument with a MW" 
on it as referred to in the BLM notes had not been found; that 
there has been no east-west verification by the surveyor's office; 
that no work had been done to locate the beginning point of 
ISO 
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Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2; that he had no knowledge 
of where Swenson had set his point of beginning for Little Mountain 
No. 2; that he did not believe the point where the cedar post 
had been placed was the point used as the beginning of that 
subdivision; that he could not state that the cedar post is 
at the original southwest corner of Section 27 as located by 
the BLM survey of 1881; that he had no knowledge of any endeavor 
of the county to locate lot corners in Little Mountain No. 2; 
and that he had no knowledge of any use ever being made by the 
county of the steel pipe at the southwest corner of Lot 26 in 
any of its surveys. 
The plaintiff called various witnesses and presented many 
exhibits in his effort to meet his burden of proof as to the 
location of the common boundary between lots 38 and 39 and the 
alleged trespass onto 39 by defendants. Norman Andreason testified 
he purchased lot 26 (located on the east side of the canyon 
roadway) in September, 1949 and said the steel pipe was in place 
at its southwest corner at the time of purchase. 
Joseph Yaroz, a cadasteral surveyor for the Utah State 
Department of Transportation (DOT) , testified the DOT was involved 
in a survey of Emigration Canyon in 1932 to 1936 and he produced 
a field book of the state's survey of the highway which related 
to the lower part of the survey through Little Mountain Subdivision 
No. 2, not including lots 25, 38 or 3t, together with a plat 
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of the highway showing real property acquired by the state through 
purchase# but not that acquired through condemnation action, 
Varoz testified the field notes contain a drawing of the southwest 
corner of Section 27 and that the state surveyors found the 
cedar post installed by the county and used it as a tie to monuments 
for road stations. He also testified the original BLM notes 
contained data showing that in going north between sections 
27 and 28 (west section line of 27) distances measured were 
two chains to conglomerate rock, four chains to a 50 foot high 
wall, 18 chains to the top of a north-south ridge, 40 chains 
to a point where a sandstone marker 16,,x9wx8" was set for the 
west 1/4 corner by which a mound of stones was erected, and 
80 chains to the corner for sections 21, 22, 27 and 28 (the 
northwest corner of 27) where a limestone monument 14,,x9,,x6w 
was set with stated markings and a stone mound alongside. 
Varoz testified the DOT field book notes agreed with the 
original BLM notes, and that the BLM notes contained calls from 
the southwest corner of east five chains to the road and 6.5 
chains to Emigration Creek. He further testified that the DOT 
survey work determined that the beginning point of Little Mountain 
No. 2 was 100 feet west of the cedar post; that in drawing its 
highway plan the state shows the beginning point of that subdivision 
to be 100 feet west and six feet north of the cedar post; that 
the beginning point of the subdivision could not start at the 
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cedar post because the state1s survey had otherwise located 
it as just stated; because the procedure used by the state was 
that used in locating an obliterated monument; because the beginning 
point of the subdivision it used shows the distance east to 
the road is in conformity to the original subdivision plat; 
that the state both purchased and condemned properties based 
upon its determination of the beginning of the subdivision; 
and because if the post were used all properties and the road 
would be shifted eastward about 100 feet from their existing 
location, Varoz, by placing platted drawings on a light table, 
stated that this showed that such was the result if the beginning 
of the subdivision was placed at the cedar post* 
Varoz further testified that the steel pipe at the northwest 
corner of lot 25 would be shifted about 75 feet east and 15 
feet north if the cedar post were used as the beginning of the 
subdivision and would no longer correspond to the existing corners 
of 25 and 26. Varoz said the state's right of way map establishes 
the boundary lines of the lots of the subdivision and that the 
legal documents by which the state acquired right of way property 
as shown in the exhibits, contain descriptions based upon the 
state's location of the beginning point of the subdivision. 
Varoz testified that the state's right of way map does not take 
preference over the certified county map, which fixes the cedar 
post as the southwest corner of Section 27, but that it does 
is 
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establish the boundary lines of the lots and the beginning point 
of the subdivision. 
Robert Jones, a licensed surveyor employed by Bush and 
Gudgell, an engineering firm since 1951 and who has supervised 
all land surveys for it for 34 years, made a survey for plaintiff 
in January, 1983, to establish the lot line between lots 38 
and 39. In making such survey Jones testified the control points 
used were two county monuments for bearings and the steel pipe 
at the northwest corner of lot 25 was used for horizontal or 
lateral control. The county monuments he used were those appearing 
upon the county survey map of Emigration Canyon Road. Jones 
said he had used the steel pipe in Emigration Canyon surveys 
since 1951 when its location was pointed out to him by George 
Gudgell at that time. From the county monuments he surveyed 
down to the steel pipe and from there established the common 
line between Lots 38 and 39. Jones produced field notes of 
other Bush & Gudgell surveys in Emigration Canyon in which the 
steel pipe was used. He said the pipe had to his knowledge 
been used as a marker for more than 45 years. 
Jones stated in May, 1962, he ran a survey for defendants 
and used the steel pipe in doing so. No survey plat was then 
made because the instructions from Struhs was not to certify 
it. Jones testified that with respect to his use of the steel 
pipe as a marker for the northwest corner of Lot 25, he had 
i£ 
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tied it back to the cedar post and determined that it did not 
mathematically tie in, but rather was off 107 feet east and 
west and six to seven feet north and south. He then assumed 
the pipe to correctly establish the northwest corner of Lot 
25 and ran the survey back as originally platted to determine 
the location of the southwest corner of Section 27. He testified 
it was not at the cedar post, which, if so used, would put the 
corner of Lot 25 80 to 90 feet up the canyon from where its 
present location is said to be. He made a personal search for 
the monument at what he concluded was the southwest corner of 
Section 27 because it was the beginning point of the subdivision 
as he surveyed it to be. He measured the distance to the road 
and creek from this point and said his measurements compared 
closely to the original BLM notes, which measurements, if taken 
from the cedar post, would put the road and creek where they 
are not actually located. Jones stated he had requested the 
county surveyor at least two dozen tiroes to locate the true 
section corner to give surveyors something valid to work with 
but without success. Section 17-23-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953 
as amended, places the duty upon each county surveyor, on order 
of the county commissioners, to at once re-establish missing 
or obliterated government lines and corners and perpetuate the 
same by suitable monuments. 
i£5 
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Jones' testimony was, as shown by his survey plat for plaintiff, 
that defendants1 chain link fence ran southward 79 feet from 
the dividing line between Lots 38 and 39 along the west side 
of the roadway and then angles into Lot 39 for a distance of 
44.9 feet in such a direction that the west end of the fence 
is eight feet north from the south line of Lot 39 or about 92 
feet south from its north line, 
Jones expressed the view that the Killyon subdivision overlaps 
Little Mountain No. 2 by about 47 feet, based upon his mathematical 
calculation and the assumption that the location by the county 
of the northwest corner of Section 27, the beginning point of 
the Killyon subdivision, was accurate. 
Plaintiff also called James C. Schuchert as a witness. 
He has been a licensed surveyor in Otah since 1965. Prior to 
October, 1983, when he formed his own company, Schuchert was 
employed by Coon, King and Knowlton. While so employed, he 
made a survey of the McMillian property which consisted of the 
lower 1/2 of Lot 41 and Lots 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 
and the north 1/2 of 50. The survey was made in 1975 and again 
in 1979 when additional land (including the lower 1/2 of Lot 
41) was acquired by McMillian. Schuchert also made a survey 
for plaintiff based upon his McMillian surveys. 
Schuchert testified he began his survey from the cedar 
Post which he assumed to be the southwest corner of 
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Section 27 and surveyed up from that post and could not make 
anything fit. He examined the recorder's records and found 
deeds that made reference to a concrete wall and the steel pipe 
and from the pipe he ran a survey back towards the cedar post 
and determined where he thought the subdivision should be located. 
He assumed then that the steel pipe was at the northwest corner 
of Lot 25 and stated his position was that the roadway was an 
indication as to where the subdivision should be and that if 
the cedar post were used, it would push the subdivision across 
the road and east of it. He testified that to him the road 
was a monument and by use of the cedar post as the beginning 
point of the subdivision, the west boundary of the subdivision 
would correspond to the west side of the road. 
Schuchert stated his knowledge of the steel pipe came from 
references to it which he found in recorded deeds and that its 
use made properties more nearly fit to existing conditions. 
During his work he obtained the BLM notes and township plat 
and found no chain of evidence that the sandstone monument noted 
therein as being the southwest corner of Section 27 had been 
replaced by the cedar post. He said he was more concerned with 
where the subdivision was established than with the location 
of the post and he considered how the subdivision was laid out 
was more important than where the point of beginning was stated 
to be, expressing the view that the original surveyor of the 
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subdivision may not in fact have actually located the southwest 
corner of the section. 
In his survey for plaintiff he utilized the McMillian survey, 
the steel pipe and "other" monuments. His survey put plaintiff's 
house 86.4 feet from the south line of the north 1/2 of Lot 
41 and 46.3 feet west of the east line with the north side of 
the house 134 feet from the north line of Lot 39. His survey 
also shows defendants constructed a chain link fence to extend 
77 feet south of the northeast corner of Lot 39. His survey 
of plaintiff's property was, according to Schuchert, consistent 
in making the south line of plaintiff's property identical to 
the north line of McMillian's property, which would be along 
the middle line of Lot 41. He added that if the cedar post 
were taken as the point of beginning of the subdivision, the 
west line of plaintiff's property would coincide with the east 
line as surveyed from the steel pipe, the south line would shift 
about 14 feet to the north and plaintiff's house would not be 
on his property. 
Schuchert also testified that if a beginning point is not 
found, the procedure to be followed was to use other monuments, 
streets, fences, corners of lots and parol evidence. He said 
he looks for the best evidence and he considered the steel pipe 
at the northwest corner of Lot 25 to be the "best evidence", 
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although he assumed the steel pipe to be at that northwest corner 
and stated the validity of his survey was based thereon. 
Carl Larsen, a licensed engineer since 1966, the county 
surveyor from 1975 to 1979, and an employee of Bush and Gudgell 
for 15 years, testified as a witness for plaintiff. Larsen 
was involved in the 1962 survey made at defendants' request 
for the survey of one lot line. No plat was then made but the 
field notes written at the time were received into evidence. 
The pipe was used in the Struhs survey in 1962 and stakes were 
installed for the lot line. On January 17, 1984 Larsen signed 
a survey plat he had made at plaintiff's request of Lots 37 
and 38 and of Lots 25 through 36. In doing so he used two county 
monuments and the steel pipe. In his use of that pipe he said 
he was aware of a number of recorded documents using it, of 
the number of surveyors using it as a control, of the DOT use 
of it on its 1936 plat, and was aware that if used it seemed 
to fit the conditions of the subdivision. 
Larsen said he was aware of the cedar post and he knew 
that if it were used as the beginning point of the subdivision 
the subdivision would be shifted to the east and homes of the 
parties would lie outside of the subdivision. He testified 
the north-south distance from the northwest corner of Section 
27 to the cedar post was 2 x 2612.93 feet or 5225.86 feet, that 
he knew the north-south distance required by Killyon and Little 
129 
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Mountain No. 2 exceeds that by about 40 feet but that if the 
post were not used, the north-south distance available in the 
section was substantially more than if the cedar post was used. 
On his plat Larsen shows defendants1 fence to be about 
five feet east of the east boundary of Lots 37 , 38 and 39 and 
borders the west side of the roadway. He fixed the distance 
of the McMillian fence on the south and the fence line of defendants 
to the north as being 175 feetf stated the fence turns westward 
into Lot 39 upon a bearing of S 88° 30 * Wf while the south line 
of Lot 38 has a bearing of N 79 08' W on the original subdivision 
plat, and thus varies from 80 to 90 feet from the north line 
of 39. 
Larsen said his survey was dependent upon the validity 
of his use of the steel pipe as a marker for the northwest corner 
of Lot 25f together with other features shown on his plat such 
as houses and fences. Larsen discredited the use of the word 
"assumptions" by surveyors and said he prefers to use the phrase 
"professional decision." 
William F. Biggs testified as a witness for plaintiff/ 
stating he owns the lower 1/2 of Lot 50 and the upper 1/2 of 
Lot 51/ having acquired it in 1973 under a real estate contract 
which refers to the steel pipe in its description and ties it 
to a concrete retaining wall. He testified that if the Coonf 
King and Knowlton survey is used, his house is 35 feet south 
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of his north boundary and is 40 feet south of the McMillian 
fence, adding that he and McMillian established where the latter's 
fence would go but not as a boundary between their properties. 
Defendant Struhs testified he purchased his Lots 37 and 
38 in 1962 and Lot 1 of Killyon in 1965. He asked George Gudgell 
for a survey in 1962 and said Gudgell had advised him he had 
made several surveys and could not tie Little Mountain No. 2 
into Killyon and he would not certify his survey and so Struhs 
said it was of no use to him. He testified he built his house 
in 1965 on Lot 37e making his determination from "existing land 
marks and topography." However, on cross-examination it was 
brought out that both his application for a building permit 
and a proof of appropriation of water filed by him shows the 
house was to be built on parts of both 37 and 38. 
Struhs testified he had installed his chain link fence 
after a survey by Bush and Gudgell, that the fence extended 
north and south 130 feet but he could not say the southeast 
corner of this fence coincided with placement of a stake by 
Bush and Gudgell. He claimed the boundary between Lots 38 and 
39 was where he put the fence and contended the disputed line 
bisected plaintiff's house. He acknowledged he had placed dirt 
with a front end loader along the north side of that portion 
of the chain link fence that extends westward from the road, 
13 
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„ co a s p a r t o f h i s f l o o d c o n t r o l w o r k . He h i r e d J a m e s £oif>g 
r l c e to do a s u r v e y f o r h i m . 
james S t u r k e t e s t i f i e d he l i v e s in E m i g r a t i o n Canyon upon 
t i t t l e Mounta in S u b d i v i s i o n No. 1 . He h a s b e e n a l i c e n s e d s u r v e y o r 
c # 1 9 7 9 . He h a s p e r f o r m e d s u r v e y work i n K i l l y o n , L i t t l e 
n t r ; o NO. 1 and f o r d e f e n d a n t o n l y in L i t t l e M o u n t a i n No. 2 , 
*»4 was h i r e d by d e f e n d a n t S t r u h s i n May, 1 9 8 3 , t o s u r v e y L o t s 
1} and 38 and Lot 1 i n K i l l y o n . He was d o i n g s u r v e y work i n 
i l l l y o n when d e f e n d a n t a p p r o a c h e d h i m . In h i s s u r v e y S t u r k e 
*t*4 as h i s c o n t r o l p o i n t t h e n o r t h w e s t c o r n e r o f S e c t i o n 2 7 , 
4%icft was t h e b e g i n n i n g p o i n t o f t h e K i l l y o n s u b d i v i s i o n a s 
platted in 1909 . He a c c e p t e d C a s s i t y ' s p o i n t ( t h e c o u n t y s u r v e y o r ) 
4§ feting on t h e n o r t h l i n e of t h e K i l l y o n s u b d i v i s i o n and p h y s i c a l l y 
featured down t h e C a s s i t y l i n e t h r o u g h K i l l y o n and made c a l c u l a t i o n s 
m C a a i i t y ' s s t a t e d nor th l i n e . He put s t a k e s on Lot 1 of K i l l y o n , 
#H bearings of Lots 37 and 38 from C a s s i t y ' s work and s e t the 
*Ma»rs t h e r e o f b a s e d upon K i l l y o n w h i c h he s a i d a p p e a r e d t o 
** con t iguous t o L i t t l e M o u n t a i n No. 2 . S t u r k e ' s s u r v e y p l a t 
*i*c*e t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r o f L o t 38 a b o u t 20 f e e t n o r t h of 
******* c h a i n l i n k f e n c e . As t o t h e s o u t h w e s t c o r n e r o f 38 
**«* found a p o s t and c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t o be i t . He t e s t i f i e d 
* **s an o v e r l a p of K i l l y o n and L i t t l e M o u n t a i n No . 2 b u t 
not c e r t i f y h i s s u r v e y b e c a u s e he i s a w a r e t h a t t h e c o n t r o l s 
t w o
 s u b d i v i s i o n s s t i l l r e m a i n in q u e s t i o n . 
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On cross-examination Sturke said as to the northwest corner 
of Section 27 and the beginning point of Killyonf the distances 
do not match, and suggested the possibility that the beginning 
point of Killyon is not the northwest section corner. He also 
said he assumed the two subdivisions to be contiguous because 
Lots 1 and 37 have the same bearings. He calculated the north-south 
distances required by the two subdivisions to be 5272 feet, 
but said the BLM notes showed one mile between the northwest 
and southwest corners of Section 27. He concluded there was 
an overlap because he said the distance from the northwest corner 
to the cedar post was only 5225.86 feet. He said he had not 
located the north 1/4 corner of Section 27, that he had tried 
to locate other corners without success, and that his survey 
was based solely upon the Cassity survey (Ex. 40-P). 
Carl Larsen was called in rebuttal by plaintiff who testified 
that considering Sturke's survey plat, the roadway would be 
shifted about 50 feet west into the west lots of the subdivision. 
Plaintiff in rebuttal testified he and Struhs measured 
his frontage and found it 73 feet short of what it should be. 
This would be as measured from the McMillian fence along the 
middle line of Lot 41. In this regard it is noted that the 
original 1910 subdivision plat reflects that plaintiff's property 
should have an east side frontage of 252.16 feet. 
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It was based upon the evidence as summarized above that 
I ruled, as noted supra, at the end of the evidence and before 
argument that it was clear from the evidence that the cedar 
post could not be the beginning point of Little Mountain Subdivision 
No. 2 and that the county surveyor's establishment of the cedar 
post as being the southwest corner of Section 27 could not shift 
the beginning point to that post and thereby shift the whole 
subdivision to the east. In so ruling I suggested to counsel 
that any argument on that point should not be necessary. 
At that point in the proceedings I also ruled that based 
upon the evidence presented, neither party would be entitled 
to an allowance of attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 of 
the Code, and that no evidence thereon should be offered, as 
I could not find from the evidence presented during, the trial 
that the defense asserted by defendants was "without merit" 
and not asserted in "good faith." 
It is clear from the evidence that defendants' surveyor 
witness, James Sturke, endeavored to locate the dividing line 
between Lots 38 and 39 by measurements made from the beginning 
point of the Killyon subdivision which purports to be the northwest 
corner of Section 27. He made no effort to locate the beginning 
point for the Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2. While his 
testimony was given and his survey plat was received without 
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objection, it is noted that in Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General 
Oil Company, 24 Utah 2d 321, 471 P.2d 148, our supreme court 
made it clear that the location of boundary lines cannot be 
ascertained without reference to section corners or quarter 
corners as established by the survey incorporated in an original 
patent (the center of the section), and that efforts by the 
defendants therein to establish a boundary, when in their chain 
of title a guarantor had converted the description of the land 
conveyed from the center of the section to a tie with the southeast 
corner of the section and its relationship to an established 
railroad line was not valid. Thus, Sturke's effort to establish 
the location of the boundary line between Lots 38 and 39 by 
beginning his survey at what he considered to be the beginning 
point of the Killyon subdivision cannot be accepted as achieving 
that result. Although Lot 1 in Killyon, which as stated is 
owned by defendants, lies north of Lot 37 of Little Mountain 
No. 2, which is the northernmost lot in the latter subdivision, 
there is no evidence that those two lots are contiguous to each 
other. Although the south line of Lot 1 and the north line 
of Lot 37 have the same bearings, the two subdivisions have 
their separate points of beginning, making it clear that when 
Swenson surveyed and platted the two subdivisions in 1909 and 
1910, he did not begin Little Mountain No. 2 where Killyon ended 
at Lot 1. Some witnesses expressed the belief that the two 
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subdivisions overlapped while other evidence suggested that 
since the original BLM field notes show that the northwest corner 
of Section 27 was 80 chains from its southwest cornerf the 5280 
feet distance leaves a hiatus of at least eight feet between 
the two subdivisions* 
Defendants contend that if the fence constructed by McMillian 
around his property is accepted as accurately placed, giving 
plaintiff 252.16 feet of frontage on the east side of the lots 
leaves him shortchanged on the frontage the subdivision plat 
shows he should have along the east side, although he so contends 
without any proof as to where his lots or their corners are 
actually located. It was defendants' attempt to avoid this 
result that led to their construction of the chain link fence, 
the result of which was to reduce plaintiff's frontage on the 
east side by at least 73 feet, and thereby resulted in this 
lawsuit. 
At the conclusion of the trial the main thrust of defendants' 
argument was not that their evidence established the fence as 
being on the true boundary line between Lots 38 and 39, but 
rather that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence any encroachment of their fence upon plaintiff's 
property and thus no trespass. The basis of this argument is 
that all of plaintiff's witnesses erroneously based their surveys 
establishing the boundary between the two lots by use of the 
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steel pipe and their assumption that it truly marked the location 
of the northwest corner of Lot 25 of the subdivision. 
There is no doubt that the steel pipe was so used by witnesses 
who attempted to locate that boundary line, nor is there any 
doubt that if the steel pipe be accepted as validly establishing 
that corner of Lot 25, the encroachment of defendants' chain 
link fence onto the east frontage of and into Lot 39 is clearly 
established. There is no evidence in the record as to who placed 
the steel pipe at its existing location, or as to when it was 
placed, or as to how the party placing it established that point 
as being the true location of the northwest corner of Lot 25 
as platted by Swenson on his original 1910 survey. As already 
noted, if the cedar post installed by the county surveyor as 
the southwest corner of Section 27 is accepted as the beginning 
point of the subdivision, the steel post has no validity as 
a true marker of that corner and the whole subdivision becomes 
a hopeless mess. While the county surveyor has the statutory 
duty of locating lost or obliterated monuments, as noted supra, 
he might establish that corner for future use but he cannot 
thereby shift property lines in an established subdivision whose 
beginning point is, in fact, not at the cedar post. 
All witnesses were in agreement that the cedar post could 
not be the beginning point of the subdivision and that such 
point was at least 100 feet to the west and several feet to 
1^' 
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the north of the post. None of the witnesses who testified 
were ever successful in locating the original sandstone marker 
which the 1881 field notes of the BLM described as being placed 
at the southwest corner of Section 27. Swenson's plat of Little 
Mountain No. 2 shows he was then the county surveyor and as 
such certified his own plat to be correct. As noted, his beginning 
point was defined as the southwest corner of Section 27, but 
the plat makes no reference to any sandstone monument at that 
point and his field notes are not in evidence. There is no 
affirmative evidence to establish the location of the southwest 
corner of Section 27 as created by the 1881 survey. Acceptance 
of the steel post as the northwest corner of Lot 25 by various 
surveyors and their surveys back to the point of beginning of 
the subdivision does not re-establish that southwest corner, 
but does show that the point of beginning of the subdivision 
is not, and could not be, the cedar post. 
In Barbizon (supra) our Supreme Court cited with approval 
the following: 
"But the government surveys are, as a matter of 
law, the best evidence; and if the boundaries of land 
are clearly established thereby, other evidence is 
superfluous and may be excluded; the best evidence 
is the corners actually fixed upon the ground by the 
government surveyor, in default of which the field 
notes and plats come next....1' 
As set forth in my summary of the testimony, DOT employee 
Joseph Varoz testified the DOT field book notes agreed with 
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the original BLM notes with respect to calls from the southwest 
corner and that its survey map made in DOT's work of obtaining 
land from owners for road construction purposes shows the steel 
pipe at the northwest corner of Lot 25. Robert Jones in his 
testimony stated that after determining the cedar post could 
not be mathematically tied into the subdivision, he surveyed 
back from the steel pipe to what he considered to be the southwest 
corner as the beginning point of the subdivision and made measure-
ments which he said compared closely to those mentioned in the 
original BLM field notes. 
It is my opinion such use of the original BLM field notes 
in verifying the point of beginning of the subdivision as measured 
back from the steel pipe verifies the steel post as accurately 
marking the northwest corner of Lot 25 and I so find. Thus, 
its use in the surveys made, as testified to by the witnesses, 
as a true marker of that corner is validly done and I so find. 
In so ruling, I note in the record an absence of proof 
by defendant as to the location of his own lot corners or boundary 
lines. He contended that the portion of the chain link fence 
running west was on the property line between Lots 38 and 39, 
but stated that if extended he would bisect plaintiff's house. 
He had a couple of surveys, one in 1962, in which boundary stakes 
were placed, but they were never used by defendants as a deter-
mination of their property line. It appears from the record 
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that in constructing his fence defendant Struhs was more concerned 
with the placement of the McMillian fence and undertook to fence 
off a tract* of land he considered as his own without regard 
to plaintiff's lots and their frontage along the east side. 
It may well be that surveys of property in Emigration Canyon 
leave something to be desired, but neither the location of other 
lot lines in the subdivisions in the canyon nor the rights of 
other owners are before the Court, and this Court is unable 
to even consider the same. The issues before the Court in this 
lawsuit relate only to the location of the common boundary between 
Lots 38 and 39 and the validity of the use of the steel post 
as a marker in establishing that boundary. 
Therefore, I find the defendants' chain link fence extends 
along the frontage of Lot 39 by at least 73 feet and that in 
its turn to the west it intrudes into Lot 39 for the length 
of that fence. I thus find that defendants have committed a 
trespass upon plaintiff's property for which the injunctive 
relief requested by plaintiff should be granted. At the time 
of trial counsel for plaintiff stated monetary damages for the 
trespass were not being sought, but that in lieu thereof plaintiff 
requested an order of the Court directing defendants to remove 
the chain link fence from Lot 39 and along its frontage on the 
east side thereof, and for removal of the dirt which defendant 
i-i 
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Struhs dumped along the north side of that portion of the fence 
running west onto Lot 39. Such requested relief is granted. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate 
Findings and Conclusions, together with a Judgment, unless the 
parties by written stipulation waive the same pursuant to Rule 
52(c) in view of this written Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this A/—*~ day of August, 1984. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAD HATANAKA 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
K. E. STRUHS and 
JACQUELINE STRUHS, his wife, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-82-3418 
(Judge Bryant Croft) 
The trial of the above-captioned case having been held 
on July 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1984, before the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah; with John S. Chindlund of the firm of Prince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler appearing for plaintiff, and Roy G. Haslam 
L:\rnui i 
±68 
of the firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch appearing on behalf of 
defendants; and the Court, having reviewed and considered the 
pleadings on file herein, the exhibits presented at trial, the 
testimony of the witnesses and the parties, the final arguments 
of counsel, and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 (hereinafter 
I "Little Mountain") and Killyons subdivision (hereinafter "Kill-
yons") are located in Emigration Canyon, Section 27, TIN, R2E, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Little Mountain lies to the south 
of Killyons. E. G. Swenson platted both subdivisions; in 1909 
he recorded the subdivision plat for Killyons in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's office, and in 1910 he recorded the subdivi-
sion plat for Little Mountain in that office. The beginning 
point for Little Mountain, as stated in the recorded plat of 
the subdivision, is the southwest corner of Section 27. The 
plat makes no reference to a sandstone monument at that point, 
although the original 1881 BLM field notes refer to a sandstone 
monument having been placed at the southwest corner of Section 
27. The beginning point for Killyons, as stated in the 
recorded plat of the subdivision, is the northwest corner of 
Section 27. 
INCE. YEATES 
3ELDZAHLER 
"kxx Mony Plaza 
East 500 Soutft — 2""" 
,art Lake City ^ <r* 
Utah 84111 1 JW 
101)521-3760 J L * - * " * ' 
2. Plaintiff is the owner of Lots 39, 40 and the 
northerly half of Lot 41 in Little Mountain. The recorded 
Little Mountain Subdivision plat establishes that plaintiff's 
property has an east side frontage of 252,16 feet. 
3. Defendants are the owners of Lots 37 and 38 in 
Little Mountain and Lot 1 in Killyons. 
4. Plaintiff's Lot 39 lies directly to the south of 
and shares a common boundary line with defendants' Lot 38. 
Plaintiff acquired his Lot 39 by purchase in 1966. Defendants 
acquired their Lot 38 by a quit claim deed dated June 27, 1962. 
5. When Section 27 was originally surveyed by the 
Bureau of Land Management (hereinafter "BLM") in 1881, the 
original field notes state that a sandstone monument was placed 
at the southwest corner of Section 27. This sandstone monument 
has never been located, although searched for by independent 
surveyors and the Salt Lake County Surveyor's office. 
6. The original BLM field notes made in conjunction 
with the 1881 BLM survey, contain calls from the southwest 
corner of Section 27 of five chains east to the road and 6.5 
chains east to Emigration Canyon. The BLM field notes also 
contain data showing distances along the west boundary line of 
Section 27, north from its southwest corner, of two chains to 
conglomerate rock, four chains to a 50 foot high wall, 18 
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chains to the top of a north-south ridge, 40 chains to a point 
where a sandstone marker 16" x 9" x 8" was set for the west 1/4 
corner by which a mound of stones was erected, and 80 chains to 
the corner for Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28 (the northwest corner 
of 27) where a limestone monument 14" x 9" x 6" was set with 
stated markings and a stone mound alongside, 
7. At some indefinite time in the past, the Salt 
Lake County Surveyor inserted a 6" x 6 " cedar post in the 
ground and declared it to be the southwest corner of Section 
27. If the cedar post is used as the beginning point of Little 
Mountain, the entire subdivision is shifted to the east approx-
imately 107 feet and to the north approximately six feet, leav-
ing the homes of some of the owners of the west lots of the 
subdivision outside of, or upon the west boundary line of the 
subdivision. Nothing fits in surveys made in Little Mountain 
when the cedar post is used as the beginning point of the sub-
division and with respect to plaintiff's property, the use of 
the cedar post as the beginning point of the subdivision would 
result in plaintiff's house no longer being situated on his 
property. 
8. The Salt Lake County Surveyor's office has done 
no work to locate the platted beginning point of Little Moun-
tain or any lot corners in Little Mountain. 
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9. The Salt Lake County Surveyor's office has done 
no work in an east-west direction to compare the location of 
the cedar post to the location of the southwest corner of Sec-
tion 27, as identified in the original BLM field notes. 
10. The Utah State Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter "DOT") performed a survey of Emigration Canyon 
between 1932 and 1936. 
11. The DOT field notes relating to its survey agree 
with the original BLM notes, including the calls from the 
southwest corner of Section 27 of east five chains to the road 
and 6.5 chains to Emigration Creek. 
12. During the course of this survey, the state sur-
veyors found the cedar post which had been installed by Salt 
Lake County and used it as a tie to monuments for road stations. 
13. The DOT survey determined that the beginning 
point of Little Mountain was 100 feet west and six feet north 
of the cedar post. The drawing of the DOT survey Drawing No. 
G-97 (the right of way map) located the beginning point of 
Little Mountain at this latter location and platted the sub-
division and the lots therein from this point. 
14. The procedure used by DOT in locating the begin-
ning point of Little Mountain was that used in locating an 
obliterated monument. The distance from the point of beginning 
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of Little Mountain to the road, as shown in the DOT'S right of 
way map, conforms to the distance from the point of beginning 
of the subdivision to the road, as shown on the original 
recorded subdivision plat. 
15. The DOT'S right of way map of Little Mountain 
sets forth the boundary lines of the lots of the subdivision 
based upon the location of the beginning point of Little Moun-
tain, which as determined and drawn by the DOT, was 100 feet 
west and six feet north of the cedar post. 
16. The legal documents by which the State of Utah 
purchased and condemned right of way property in Little Moun-
tain contain descriptions based upon the location of the begin-
ning point of Little Mountain as determined and drawn by the 
DOT in the right of way map. 
17. The DOT's right of way map shows a steel pipe 
located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little Mountain. 
The southwest corner of Lot 26 in Little Mountain is contiguous 
to the northwest corner of Lot 25. There is no evidence in the 
record as to who placed the steel pipe at that location, when 
it was placed, or how the party who placed it established that 
point as being the true location of the northwest corner of Lot 
25 as platted by Swenson on his original 1910 survey <, 
18. Norman Andreason purchased Lot 26 in Little Moun-
tain (located on the east side of the canyon roadway) in Sep-
tember, 1949, and the steel pipe was in place at its southwest 
corner at the time of purchase. 
19. The land surveying firms of Bush & Gudgell, Coon, 
King and Knowlton, and Larsen & Malmquist have made a number of 
surveys of properties in Little Mountain (including surveys of 
plaintiff's property) since 1951 utilizing the steel pipe as a 
control point. These surveys have recognized the steel pipe as 
being located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 of the 
subdivision. 
20. The aforementioned surveys make properties in 
Little Mountain fit existing conditions, including the roadway, 
houses and other structures (including the homes of John 
McMillian, Jr., William F. Biggs, Norman Andreason and plain-
tiff), a concrete retaining wall on the west side of the road-
way (which is tied to the steel pipe in the real estate con-
tract, pursuant to which Biggs acquired the lower one-half of 
Lot 50 and the upper one-half of Lot 51), and the fence that 
surrounds the property of John McMillian, Jr., which includes 
the north one-half of Lot 50, Lots 49, 48, 47, 46, 45, 44, 43, 
42, an the lower one-half of Lot 41. 
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21 • A number of recorded deeds conveying property 
within Little Mountain, including deeds to and from Salt Lake 
County in the late 1940's and early 1950fs, utilize the steel 
pipe as a reference point and identify the steel pipe as being 
located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 of Little Mountain. 
22. The steel pipe has been used as a marker for 
surveys in Little Mountain for more than 45 yearsf including 
surveys performed for John McMillianf Jr., who owns the prop-
erty immediately to the south of plaintiff, and William F. 
Biggs, who owns the property immediately to the south of 
McMillian. 
23. Surveyors have tied the steel pipe back to the 
cedar post and have determined that the location of the cedar 
post does not conform to the location of the beginning point of 
the subdivision as set forth on the recorded plat of the 
subdivision. 
24. Surveyors who have utilized the steel pipe to 
locate the beginning point of Little Mountain have determined 
that such beginning point is approximately 107 feet to the west 
and six to seven feet to the north of the cedar post. The 
beginning point of Little Mountain as thus determined closely 
conforms to the location of the subdivision beginning point set 
forth in the DOT'S 1936 survey. In addition, the distances 
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from this point to the road and to Emigration Creek compare 
closely to the distances from the southwest corner of Section 
27 to the road and creek as stated in the original BLM field 
notes. 
25. If the distances from the southwest corner of 
Section 27 east to the road and creek as identified in the 
original BLM notes are measured from the cedar post, then the 
road and creek would be situated where they are not actually 
located. 
26. If the cedar post is accepted as the beginning 
point of Little Mountain then the northwest corner of Lot 25 
would be pushed up the canyon 75 to 90 feet from the present 
location of the steel pipe. 
27. Carl Larsen, while an employee of Bush & Gudgell, 
ran a survey for defendants in May, 1962, utilizing the steel 
pipe as the horizontal or lateral control point. Although 
stakes were installed by Larsen on the boundary line between 
Lots 38 and 39, now survey plat was made because defendants 
instructed Bush & Gudgell not to certify the survey. 
28. In January, 1983, Robert Jones, a licensed sur-
veyor employed by Bush & Gudgell, performed a survey for plain-
tiff to determine the location of the boundary line between 
Lots 38 and 39. In making this survey, Jones utilized 
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the steel pipe as the horizontal or lateral control point. 
James Schuchert, a licensed surveyor employed by Coon, King & 
Knowlton, and Carl Larsen, a licensed surveyor employed by 
Larsen and Malmquist, also performed surveys for plaintiff 
which utilized the steel pipe as the horizontal or lateral 
control point. Each of these surveys located the disputed 
boundary line in the same location, which was the same location 
as the line which was staked for defendants by Bush & Gudgell 
in 1962. In performing these surveys, the surveyors concluded 
that the steel pipe was located at the northwest corner of Lot 
25 of Little Mountain, as originally platted. 
29. The original BLM field notes state that the 
north-south length of the west side of Section 27 is 5,280 
feet. The north-south distance required to accommodate both 
Killyons and Little Mountain is 5,272.06 feet. The north-south 
distance between the cedar post and the existing Salt Lake 
County monument in the area of the northwest corner of Section 
27 is 5,225.86 feet. If the beginning point of Little Mountain 
is to the west of the cedar post, there will be substantially 
more north-south distance available in Section 27. 
30. In 1979, defendants installed a chain link fence 
which ran north and south along the easterly line of the sub-
division lots lying west of Emigration Canyon Road, From 
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its southern most point near the west side of Emigration Canyon 
Road, said fence runs in a westerly direction approximately 45 
feet. Defendants did not use the boundary stakes, which had 
been installed by Bush & Gudgell in 1962, to determine their 
property line. In 1984 defendants placed a substantial amount 
of fill dirt on the northerly side of this 45-foot section of 
fence. The bearing of this 45-foot section of fence is S 88° 
30' W, while the bearing on the south line of Lot 38 on the 
original Little Mountain Subdivision Plat is N 79° 08' West. 
31. Defendants asserted that they built their house 
on Lot 37 in 1965, making their determination as to the loca-
tion of their property from "existing land marks and topog-
raphy." However, the building permit and proof of appropria-
tion of water filed by defendants establish that defendants 
built their house on Lot 38 and the lower part of Lot 37. 
These documents show, respectively, defendants1 house to be 
approximately 40 feet and 25 feet north of the common boundary 
line between Lots 38 and 39. 
32. The survey introduced at trial by defendants was 
performed by James Sturke, a licensed surveyor. Sturke's 
survey purports to locate the common line between Lots 38 and 
39 in Little Mountain by measurements made from the presumed 
beginning point of Killyons. In performing his survey, Sturke 
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assumed that the present Salt Lake County monument at the 
northwest corner of Section 27 was the point of beginning of 
Killyons and that Killyons and Little Mountain were contiguous, 
as originally platted, 
33. The evidence presented does not establish that 
the monument used by Sturke as his beginning point is located 
either at the point where the original BLM notes describe the 
location of the monument at the northwest corner of Section 27f 
or at the point of beginning of Killyons, as originally platted. 
34. Sturke's survey is uncertified and Sturke made no 
attempt to locate the beginning point of Little Mountain. 
Sturke has performed no other surveys of any other property in 
Little Mountain. Sturke did not locate the west one-quarter 
corner of Section 27 or any of the other section corners he 
attempted to find. 
35. Although Lot 1 in Killyons lies north of defen-
dants' Lot 37 and the south line of Lot 1 and the north line of 
Lot 37 have the same bearings, the two subdivisions have their 
separate points of beginning, making it clear that when Swenson 
surveyed and platted the two subdivisions in 1909 and 1910, he 
did not begin Little Mountain where Killyons ended at Lot 1. 
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36. Sturke performed his survey for defendants in the 
fall of 1983. Defendant Kenneth Struhs was present when Sturke 
installed a stake in the ground at a point Sturke believed to 
be the southeast corner of defendants' Lot 38. This stake was 
placed about 20 feet north of the southeast corner of defen-
dants' fence. Sturke advised defendant Kenneth Struhs at the 
time of installing this stake that the stake was installed 
where Sturke believed the southeast corner of Lot 38 was 
located. 
37. Under Sturke's survey plat the roadway through 
Little Mountain would be shifted about 50 feet west into the 
west lots of the subdivision and defendants' house would be in 
the platted road. 
38. The survey performed for plaintiff by James C. 
Schuchert shows that plaintiff's house is situated 86.4 feet 
from the south line of the north 1/2 of Lot 41 and 46.3 feet 
west of the east line with the north side of the house 134 feet 
from the north line of Lot 39. This survey also shows that 
defendants' chain link fence extends 77 feet south of the 
northeast corner of Lot 39. 
39. The survey performed for plaintiff by Carl Larsen 
shows that defendants' fence lies about five feet east of the 
east boundary of Lots 37, 38, and 39 and borders the west side 
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of the roadway* The distance between the McMillian fence to 
the south of plaintiff's property and the fence line of defen-
dants to the north is 175 feet. At the^south end of defen-
dants' fence, the fence turns westward into Lot 39 upon a 
bearing of S 88° 30' W. Since the platted south line of Lot 38 
has a bearing of N 79° 08' W, the distance that the fence 
extends down into Lot 39 varies from 80 feet where the fence 
turns westward to 90 feet where the fence terminates. 
40. The survey performed for plaintiff by Robert 
Jones shows that defendants' chain link fence runs southward 79 
feet from the dividing line between Lots 38 and 39 along the 
west side of the roadway and then angles into Lot 39 for a 
distance of 44.9 feet in such a direction that the west end of 
the fence is eight feet north from the south line of Lot 39 or 
about 92 feet south from the north line of Lot 39. 
41. Plaintiff and defendant Kenneth Struhs measured 
the distance of the frontage of plaintiff's land along the 
roadway between the McMillian fence on the south and defen-
dants' fence on the north. This distance was 73 feet short of 
the 252.16 feet of east side frontage contained in plaintiff's 
property, according to the original Little Mountain Subdivision 
plat. 
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42. Aside from Sturke's survey, defendants presented 
no proof as to where their lots or their corners are actually 
located or that defendants' east side frontage, as shown on 
Little Mountain plat, will be reduced by giving plaintiff 
252.16 feet of frontage on the ease side of plaintiff's lots 
commencing from McMillian's fence. 
43. The beginning point of Little Mountain is not and 
could not be located at the cedar post. The beginning point of 
the subdivision is at least 100 feet west and several feet 
north of the cedar post. 
44. In constructing their fence, defendants were more 
concerned with the placement of McMillian's fence and undertook 
to fence off a tract of land they considered their own without 
regard to plaintiff's lots and the east side frontage thereof. 
45. Defendants' chain link fence extends along the 
frontage of plaintiff's Lot 39 by at least 73 feet, and in its 
turn to the west it intrudes into Lot 39 for the length of the 
fence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 17-23-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
places the duty upon each county surveyor, on order of the 
county commissioners, to re-establish missing or obliterated 
government lines and corners and perpetuate the same by suit-
able monuments. 
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2. In the past, the Salt Lake County Surveyor 
installed a 6" x 6" cedar post in the ground in the general 
ajea of the southwest corner of Section 27 and declared it to 
be the southwest corner of Section 27. 
3. Although the Salt Lake County Surveyor has the 
statutory authority for relocating or re-establishing missing 
or obliterated government lines and corners, he could not by 
establishing the cedar post as the southwest corner of Section 
27 thereby move the beginning point of Little Mountain Subdivi-
sion No, 2 to the cedar post because, in fact, the beginning 
point of the subdivision as platted in 1910 is elsewhere. 
4. The location of the point of beginning of Little 
Mountain Subdivision No. 2 designated in the 1936 Utah DOT 
right of way map of Emigration Canyon Road, Drawing G-97, is 
consistent with the location of the southwest corner of Section 
27 as described in the original BLM field notes, and with the 
distance from the beginning point of the subdivision to the 
road as shown in the original subdivision plat. 
5. The 1936 Utah DOT right of way map of Emigration 
Canyon Road, Drawing G-97, accurately located the beginning 
point of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, as originally 
platted. 
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6. The cedar post is not located at the point of 
beginning of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, as originally 
platted. 
7. The point of beginning of Little Mountain Sub-
division No. 2 as originally platted, and as identified in the 
Utah DOT Drawing G-97, is approximately 100 feet west and 6 
feet north of the cedar post. 
8« The use of the original BLM field notes by the 
Utah DOT in its survey and by the surveying firms of Bush & 
Gudgell; Coon, King & Knowlton, and Larsen & Malmquist in their 
surveys in Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 to verify the 
point of beginning of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 as 
measured back from the steel pipe, verify the steel pipe as 
accurately marking the northwest corner of Lot 25. 
9. The use of the steel pipe as the control point in 
the surveys performed for plaintiff by the surveying firms of 
Bush & Gudgell; Coon, King & Knowlton; Larsen & Malmquist to 
locate the lot line between Lots 38 and 39 was proper and such 
surveys accurately located said lot line. 
10. Defendants survey performed by James Sturke is 
not probative as to the location of the lot line between Lots 
38 and 39 of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, because his 
survey began at a point Sturke considered to be the beginning 
-17- 185 
point of Killyons Subdivision (without regard to the location 
of the beginning point of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2) 
and because the survey was based upon the erroneous assumption 
that Killyons Subdivision and Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 
were contiguousf when the evidence establishes that the two 
subdivisions are not contiguous. 
11. Defendants* chain link fence extends along the 
frontage of Lot 39 by at least 73 feet and in its turn to the 
west it intrudes into Lot 39 for the length of the fence. 
12. Defendants have trespassed upon plaintiff's 
property. 
13* The evidence presented during the trial does not 
support plaintiff's claim that the defense asserted by defen-
dants was "without merit" and not asserted in "good faith." 
14. Neither party is entitled to an allowance of 
attorneys' fees under Section 78-27-56 of the Code. 
15. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of punitive 
damages because defendants' trespass was not willful and 
malicious. 
16. It is within the Court's discretion to issue a 
mandatory permanent injunction, and such an injunction is 
proper in this case. 
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17. The permanent injunctive relief requested by 
plaintiff, including removal of the fence and removal of the 
dirt and debris dumped on the north side of the fence by 
defendants, if demanded by plaintiff, should be granted. 
18. With respect to the fence, if it has not already 
been removed, defendants shall, without further demand by 
plaintiff, remove the fence to the extent noted in Paragraph 11 
above. Such removal shall be performed as soon as weather con-
ditions permit. 
19. With respect to the dirt and debris dumped by 
defendants on the north side of the fence, as soon as weather 
conditions permit, plaintiff may given defendants a written 
demand to remove such dirt, and defendants shall remove such 
dirt within a reasonable time following such demand. 
20. Plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory permanent 
injunction enjoining defendants, their agents, servants and 
employees from building, or causing to be built, any fences 
upon plaintiff's Lot 39 or in the area between said lot and 
Emigration Canyon Road, placing any fill or debris upon or 
performing any other acts to or upon plaintiff's property which 
lies to the south of the boundary line between plaintiff's Lot 
39 and defendants' Lot 38. 
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21. The boundary line between plaintiff's Lot 39 and 
defendants' Lot 38 has a bearing of N. 79° 0 8' W and commences 
at a point which is 5 feet west from the west side of Emigra-
tion Canyon Road and 73 feet north of the present southeast 
corner of defendants' fence and runs westerly on said bearing 
from said point for a distance of 116.54 feet. 
22. Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs herein 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this /*^ day of iSUJiii in', 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Croft 
Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINOLEY 
By "l**l*\_ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAUL D. VEASY, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & 
Hatch, P.C. attorneys for Petitioners, K.E. Struhs and Jacqueline 
Struhs. 
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Brief of Petitioners upon the parties to the within described 
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John S. Chindlund, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
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and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day of August 
My Commission Expires: 
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